mFerio: The design and evaluation of a peer-to-peer mobile payment system by BALAN, Rajesh Krishna et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Information Systems School of Information Systems
6-2009
mFerio: The Design and Evaluation of a Peer-to-
Peer Mobile Payment System
Rajesh Krishna BALAN
Singapore Management University, rajesh@smu.edu.sg
Narayanasamy RAMASUBBU








Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research
Part of the Software Engineering Commons
This Conference Proceeding Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Information Systems at Institutional Knowledge at
Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Information Systems by an authorized
administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
BALAN, Rajesh Krishna; RAMASUBBU, Narayanasamy; Prakobphol, Komsit; Christin, Nicolas; and Hong, Jason. mFerio: The
Design and Evaluation of a Peer-to-Peer Mobile Payment System. (2009). MobiSys'09: Proceedings of the 7th ACM International
Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications and Services, June 22-25, 2009, Kraków, Poland. 291-305. Research Collection School Of
Information Systems.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/262
mFerio: The Design and Evaluation of a Peer-to-Peer
Mobile Payment System
Rajesh Krishna Balan†, Narayan Ramasubbu†, Komsit Prakobphol‡, Nicolas Christin‡, Jason Hong‡
†Singapore Management University and ‡Carnegie Mellon University
{rajesh, nramasub}@smu.edu.sg, {kprakobp, nicolasc, jasonhong}@cmu.edu
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we present the design and evaluation of a near-field
communication-based mobile p2p payment application, called mFe-
rio, that is designed to replace cash-based transactions. We first
identify design criteria that payment systems should satisfy and
then explain how mFerio, relative to those criteria, improves on
the limitations of cash-based systems. We next describe mFerio’s
implementation and user interface design, focusing on the balance
between usability and security. Finally, we present the results of a
two-phase user study, involving a total of 104 people, that shows
that mFerio has low cognitive load and is also fast, accurate, and
easy to use – even outperforming cash in terms of speed and cogni-
tive load in common payment situations.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.m [Operating Systems]: Misc; H.5.2 [User Interfaces]: Mo-
bile Payment Systems
General Terms
Design, Human Factors, Experimentation
Keywords
Mobile Computing, User Study, Mobile Payment, p2p Payment,
NFC, Near-Field Communication, Digital Wallet
1. INTRODUCTION
Cell phones have evolved from mere communication devices
to becoming calendars, instant messaging devices, address books,
cameras, photo browsers, and shopping list organisers. Cell phones
have also gained increasing relevance as a payment vehicle. It is al-
ready possible, in some places, to use a cell phone to pay for vend-
ing machine purchases, groceries, and even airline tickets [32].
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One problem, however, is that current mobile payment solutions
all require infrastructure support. In particular, they cannot work if
at least one of the parties involved in the payment is not connected
to some back-end payment server, via either SMS or GSM/CDMA-
based technology. For example, consider the following scenario.
Bob takes a taxi, and tries to pay the taxi driver using
his cellphone when he reaches his hotel. However, the
unloading lobby is underground and neither Bob nor
the taxi driver can get a signal on their wireless equip-
ment. Bob has to dig for cash, and also has to keep
track of the receipt so he can be reimbursed later.
Ideally, there would be ubiquitous wireless networking that is re-
liable and secure. However, wireless connectivity can be affected
by a multitude of factors ranging from bad weather to telecom car-
rier incompatibilities. For example, it is possible for SMSmessages
to be delayed by several minutes or even hours, which can lead to a
poor user experience for a mobile payment system relying on SMS.
In addition to these connectivity issues, the additional cost of
subscribing to a central payment service is a likely adoption barrier
for small independent operators (“mom and pop” shops). Further-
more, a mobile payment system has to be usable and secure, both in
terms of actual implementation, as well as perception by end-users.
In this paper, we present the design and evaluation of mFerio,
a novel peer-to-peer (p2p) mobile payment system. mFerio can
be implemented on smartphones, does not require any additional
connectivity or infrastructure beyond the cell phones of the partici-
pants, and was designed with usability and security in mind. mFe-
rio is comprised of three components: 1) a digital cash system, 2)
an authentication system, and 3) an easy-to-use interface coupled
with a secure communication protocol for making p2p payments.
In this paper, we concentrate on the third aspect and defer to prior
work for the first two [6, 7, 17, 22, 39].
We make the following contributions in this paper. First, we de-
scribe the challenges involved in designing a mobile p2p payment
solution. In particular, we analyse the design space and examine
some of the key tradeoffs between usability, utility, and security.
Many of these tradeoffs are fundamental ones that any mobile p2p
payment system will face. We also identify success criteria that
payment systems have to meet. Second, we discuss the design and
implementation of mFerio and explain how it satisfies the various
success criteria. We focus specifically on the tradeoff between us-
ability and security and explain how mFerio manages to provide a
user interaction technique that provides both excellent usability and
a reasonable level of security. Third, we present the results of a two-
phase user study, involving a total of 104 participants, showing that
mFerio is very usable – requiring no training and even outperform-
ing cash in speed and cognitive load under common conditions.
2. DESIGN SPACE FOR MFERIO
We start by analysing mFerio’s design space; drawing from both
prior research [20, 31, 36, 40], and from analysis of the advantages
and disadvantages of cash payments. We chose not to compare mo-
bile payments to credit cards as credit cards require infrastructure
and thus cannot be used in a peer-to-peer manner. We grouped the
design criteria into three main categories: usability, security, and
auditing. To be successful, mFerio has to be better than cash in
multiple criteria, while not having any significant drawbacks.
2.1 Usability Criteria
A payment system needs to be highly usable by a large cross sec-
tion of the population to be viable. The following usability criteria
provide some guidance towards this goal.
Fast to use. Making a payment should not take too long. Cash is
generally a fast payment system, However, as our results show, sit-
uations involving even moderate amounts of change can slow down
cash transactions significantly.
Easy to use. The payment system should be easy to use by people
of different ages and technical competency. Cash satisfies this cri-
terion and is universally used.
Easy to learn. Anyone should be able to quickly learn how to
make payments. Cash satisfies that criterion as well, as even young
children can be taught to make cash payments.
Predictable performance. Different situations should not affect
the performance of the payment system. For example, the time
taken to make a payment should not depend on the payment amount.
As stated above, cash’s speed depends greatly on the situation.
Accurate. Users should be able to transfer exactly the amount
of money involved to the intended person, without needing correc-
tions or double checking. Cash is by and large an accurate means
of payment. However, its accuracy can be affected by the situation.
Available. The payment system should be usable anywhere and
anytime. This is one of the strengths of cash: once created, it es-
sentially requires no infrastructure to be usable. On the other hand,
providing high availability for a mobile payment system can be
difficult to meet, as it depends on numerous external factors such
as digital cash regulatory requirements across the globe, the dy-
namics between banks, cell-phone manufacturers, telecom service
providers and retailers. In this paper, we focus solely on address-
ing the usability obstacles to availability (i.e., the payment system
should not be rejected because it is hard to use).
In summary, a novel payment system, such as mFerio, should
achieve the ease of use and (as much as possible) availability of
cash, while improving on its accuracy and speed.
2.2 Security Criteria
Payment systems also need to satisfy a number of security cri-
teria. Cash has good security properties, but offers considerable
room for improvement as we discuss below.
Preserve transaction semantics integrity. The payment process
must ensure that transactions semantics are well defined, and can-
not be tampered with. In particular, transactions should be resilient
to man-in-the-middle and replay attacks, and guarantee atomicity
(i.e., interrupting a transaction will cancel the entire transaction).
Usually, transfer of physical currency requires a physical interac-
tion between the parties involved – this provides strong assurance
that the transaction semantics will be maintained.
Anonymous. Without external monitoring steps, it should not be
possible to identify who made a particular payment. Cash has very
strong anonymity properties that make it difficult to trace [21], and
a desirable payment choice for privacy-conscious users.
Tamper-proof. It should not be possible to tamper with the pay-
ment system and the monetary representation (e.g., digital cash)
used. In particular, any attempts to tamper with the system should
only result in the system being destroyed and not broken into. Cash,
in general, remains usable even if slightly defaced. Alterations re-
sulting in the coin or bill being unusable as legal tender can usually
be detected by visual inspection.
Impossible to replicate. The payment system’s monetary repre-
sentation should be impossible to create or duplicate by users. Cash
uses numerous physical security measures to prevent counterfeiting
without expensive and specialised machinery [1]. In a mobile pay-
ment system, this property demands, for instance, that users should
not be able to make a backup of their phone, make payments, and
then restore their backup and “reclaim” their spent money.
Theft resilience. The system should be resistant to theft. This
is one of the main vulnerabilities associated with cash. When a
wallet is stolen, the victim has no recovery mechanism available,
and ownership of the cash simply transfers to the thief. Mobile
payment systems, such as mFerio, can cryptographically store the
digital cash on the phone to prevent unauthorised use, thereby en-
suring that thieves have no additional incentive to steal phones.
There are already existing solutions for the properties outlined
above that can be applied to mobile payment systems. Instead of
creating novel low-level security primitives, we chose to integrate
existing security technologies [10, 11] into mFerio to achieve a co-
hesive design, with the goal of yielding a payment system that is
both usable and secure.
2.3 Auditing Criteria
It is quite common for users and businesses to regularly perform
audits of their spending habits. As such, including auditing criteria
in the design of a mobile payment system could improve its mass
market appeal. However, satisfying these criteria may require re-
laxing the anonymity criteria.
Accountable. It should be possible for user to accurately track all
payments that they have made.
Dispute resolution. It should be possible to definitively prove that
payment has been made to a particular person. This is a stronger
form of the accountability criteria.
Cash, by itself, has no provisions for auditing. There are no
automatic receipts or mechanisms for dispute resolution. It is pos-
sible to layer these features on top of the existing cash system, but
they are not available by default. We decided to support both au-
diting criteria in mFerio; making its anonymity properties weaker
than that provided by cash. mFerio uses automatic receipts to pro-
vide accounting – allowing the two parties involved in the payment
transaction to know more about each other than a corresponding
Success Criteria Implementation Details Evaluation Results SatisfiedmFerio SatisfiedCash Relative to Cash
Usability Criteria
Fast to Use Section 3.3 Section 5.5.1
√ √
Better in Some Situations
Easy to Use Section 3.3 Section 5.5.2
√ √
Same
Easy to Learn Section 3.3 Section 5.5.2
√ √
Same
Predictable Performance Section 3.3 Section 5.5.4
√ × Much Better
Accurate Section 3.3 Section 5.5.3
√ √
Same
Available —- Section 7.1a × √ Worse
Security Criteria
Anonymous Section 3.1 Section 3.2b
√ √
Slightly Worse
Transaction Semantics Section 3.1 [10, 11]c
√ √
Same
Tamper-Proof Section 3.1 [5, 7, 26]c
√ √
Same
Impossible to Replicate Section 3.1 [6, 26]c
√ √
Same
Theft Resilience Section 3.1 [11]c
√ × Much Betterd
Auditing Criteria
Accountable Section 3.2 Section 5.5.5
√ × Much Betterd
Dispute Resolution Sections 3.2 and 3.3 Section 5.5.5
√ × Much Betterd
aWe discuss some of the factors affecting mFerio’s availability in this section
bWe get anonymity by design as explained in Section 3.2
cWe use well-designed protocols that have been rigorously validated by other researchers
dFeature is completely unsupported by Cash
This table list the success criteria for mFerio. The “Implementation Details” column lists where the implementation for that criteria
is described while the “Evaluation Results” column lists where the evaluation for the criteria is presented. The “SatisfiedmFerio”
and “SatisfiedCash” columns graphically summarises how well mFerio and Cash satisfy each of the criteria respectively – ticks
(
√
) are good while crosses (×) are bad. Finally, the “Relative to Cash” column provides a quick comparison between mFerio
and Cash (mFerio is the baseline) for that criteria.
Table 1: Success Criteria for mFerio
cash transaction. However, no external party knows anything about
the transaction. We believe that this is the right tradeoff between
auditing and anonymity. If desired, the auditing features can be
turned off to achieve complete anonymity.
2.4 Summary of Criteria
Table 1 summarises the various success criteria, listed above, for
mFerio. For each success criteria, it indicates where, in this paper,
the implementation details relevant to that criteria are discussed. It
then lists where the evaluation results (either in this paper or in re-
lated work) for that criteria are presented. It also provides a graph-
ical indication of how well mFerio and cash satisfies each criteria.
Finally, it provides a short comparison between mFerio and cash
(with mFerio as the baseline) for each criteria. Overall, mFerio is
able to satisfy most of the criteria extremely well – the exception
being availability which is discussed in Section 7.1.
3. BUILDING MFERIO
We next describe the implementation of mFerio, and relate it to
the design considerations presented in Section 2. In particular, we
discuss the specific mFerio implementation details that allow it to
satisfy each of the three main success criteria groups (shown in
Table 1) listed previously.
In the p2p exchanges mFerio aims to support, there are only two
parties, the Initiator and the Recipient – but no central bank. In our
design, either party can be Receiving or Sending payment, resulting
in four possible user roles (initiating a payment request, initiating a
payment, receiving a payment request, receiving payment)– mFerio
supports all four roles. We now discuss how mFerio satisfies each
of the three criteria starting with the security criteria, followed by
the auditing criteria, and ending with the usability criteria.
3.1 Satisfying the Security Criteria
The security criteria has two main parts; 1) physical security con-
cerning the communications channel and the tokens exchanged be-
tween the phones, and 2) user security concerning the sequence of
operations that the user must do to complete a transaction. Both are
necessary elements for a secure payment system – a highly secure
token is useless if the user protocol allows users to pay unintended
people while a good user protocol is compromised if the tokens
and/or communication channel can be easily tampered with.
3.1.1 Enforcing Physical Security Requirements
A key requirement for a mobile payment solution is a secure
monetary token. In this paper, we defer to prior work for an im-
plementation of a secure monetary token – Davies [9] provides
an overview of the various digital payment tokens. In a deployed
implementation, it is likely that the specific token used will de-
pend greatly on the deployment environment (which country, bank,
agency, etc. is deploying the solution). Hence, it seems prudent to
concentrate our resources on other aspects of the mobile payment
system – that will remain constant across multiple deployments.
In addition to the secure monetary token, to achieve its physical
security requirements, mFerio extensively relies on hardware sup-
port to provide secure wireless communication mechanisms, fast
and secure authentication, and secure data storage. Note: we ex-
pect mFerio to store about $500 at most – consistent with the limits
imposed by complementary stored-value systems [12, 27].
Secure wireless communication mechanism. To promote ease
of use, mFerio should use a wireless communication medium for
transactions. This medium must be highly secure, both from sys-
tems and usability perspectives (i.e., people can easily perform any
necessary actions quickly and correctly).
We chose to use near-field communication (NFC) as mFerio’s
wireless medium. NFC has three primary advantages over other
mechanisms; First, NFC has a very short range, on the order of 1-2
inches (2.5-5cm), making it hard for intruders to intercept com-
munications. Users can clearly see anyone trying to intercept a
transaction; in contrast to longer range protocols such as WiFi and
Bluetooth. Second, it is quick and easy to set up a NFC connection
with another nearby NFC device – simply move one device near the
other. This is in contrast to Bluetooth peering which is tedious and
slow to set up. Third, NFC has a straightforward conceptual model
for users – they know exactly what device they are communicating
with, as opposed to longer-range wireless protocols.
Fast secure authentication. We designed mFerio to require users
to authenticate themselves to the mobile phone before use. Any of
the authentication mechanisms such as pincodes [2, 13], graphical
passwords and distortion functions [15], or biometric-based mech-
anisms [34, 35] can be used with the mFerio application. A full
comparison of the usability of the different authentication mecha-
nisms is beyond the scope of this paper. For this paper, we used a
Wizard of Oz approach [18] (where the system appears to be fully
functional but is actually faked under the covers) for biometric fin-
gerprint authentication. It is important to note that mobile authen-
tication mechanisms have their own flaws but they are still better
than not having any authentication at all – as is typically the case
with cash payments. We designed mFerio to be able to use any au-
thentication mechanism that gains market dominance.
Secure data storage. The last hardware requirement is secure
storage (also referred to on cellphones as a secure element), which
should only be accessible if authentication credentials have been
successfully provided. This storage will contain the cash and the
personal details of the user. If this storage is hardware protected,
it ensures that thieves will not be able to access the cash and per-
sonal details on a stolen cellphone. As such, this eliminates an ex-
tra temptation for thieves as users cannot tamper with the electronic
cash by hacking the data storage area. These secure hardware pro-
tected chips have already been released by several manufacturers
such as Gemplus, Sony, and IBM.
The above mentioned hardware enforced security mechanisms
coupled with a secure monetary token satisfy the Tamper-Proof,
Impossible to Replicate, and Theft Resilience security-related suc-
cess criteria (Table 1).
3.1.2 Detailed Payment Protocol
Hardware-enforced security as discussed above is still only a
partial solution and mFerio’s payment protocol must still enforce
transaction semantics (in the database sense of the term). As such,
mFerio mandates authentication before transactions can take place,
and uses a protocol that guarantees transaction atomicity (i.e., com-
pleted transactions should be correctly registered by both parties
involved, with the same being true for incomplete transactions).
Authentication increases the number of user steps, potentially
impacting usability negatively. However, in this case, security out-
weighs usability concerns. We adapted existing atomicity protocols
already deployed in NFC payment systems [10] and electronic wal-
let protocols [11] instead of building one from scratch.
Two-touch payment protocol. We use a two-touch protocol,
where both parties must touch phones twice to complete the trans-
action. The first touch exchanges identifying information, using
certificates, ensuring that both parties know who they are transact-
ing with, and also establishes a transient secure shared key, which
makes the transaction resilient to replay attacks and tampering by
external parties. The second touch finalises the transaction. While
it is possible to use a single-touch protocol where the whole trans-
action completes after just one touch of the phone, it also opens up
the possibility of errors where payments could be made to someone
other than the intended party. Hence, we chose to err on the side of
caution, favouring security over usability in this case.
We chose to use the Even-Goldreich-Yacobi protocol [11] to
implement monetary exchanges. An alternative would have been
Brands’ one-time spending certificate [3] which is more tolerant
of compromises of the secure storage element. However, Brands’
protocol is primarily designed for asymmetric transactions, e.g., in-
volving a point-of-sale and a payer, and would require considerable
modifications to be adapted to a peer-to-peer protocol. Conversely,
the Even-Goldreich-Yacobi protocol can be implemented without
significant changes, in mFerio. The main extension is an atomicity
requirement: if the transfer fails, the balance must revert back to
the original state before the transaction.
We chose a counter-based mechanism for mFerio as deployed
in the Even-Goldreich-Yacobi protocol, rather than a digital coin-
based mechanism because a counter based mechanism provides a
constant level of overhead; in contrast, digital coins are indivisi-
ble, and therefore may require additional overhead when the payer
does not have the exact change. The main drawback of counter-
based mechanisms is their dependence on a secure element; but as
mentioned before, a secure element (secure data storage) is read-
ily available in modern cellular phones, making the counter-based
approach viable for mFerio.
Thus, in the mFerio payment protocol, the payer’s wallet and
payee’s wallet, first (during the first touch), agree on the amount of
the transaction and authenticate each others certificates. Then, the
payer’s secure element makes sure that the amount of the transac-
tion does not exceed the wallet’s balance, deducts money, and signs
the payment message. When the phones touch again (second touch
in the two-touch protocol), the payer’s wallet sends the payment
message. The payee’s observer verifies the payment message and
adds the amount to the wallet’s balance if the message is valid. The
payee’s wallet returns an electronic receipt as a proof of a trans-
action. The transfer of payment message and digital receipt must
be atomic. If any of the transfers fail the balance must revert back
to the original state before the transaction. This method of ensur-
ing atomicity, typically used in databases and financial transactions,
minimises message transfers in the protocol.
To further enhance security, we require users to re-authenticate
themselves multiple times, at key points, during the two-touch pro-
tocol. In practice, this approach requires the authentication step to
be fast and hassle-free. If this assumption proves to be false, alter-
native strategies, such as single authentication with flexible lock-
out timers, are available [15]. We revisit this issue in the user study
(asking participants to choose between different types of payment
protocols) and the results, shown in Section 5.5.5, reinforce our de-
cision to use a two-touch protocol and multi-point authentication.
Thus the two-touch protocol, coupled with the atomicity consid-
erations discussed above, allows mFerio to satisfy the Transaction
Semantics criteria.
3.2 Satisfying the Auditing Criteria
A key part of the two-touch protocol discussed previously is the
exchange of identifying information between transacting parties af-
ter establishing a session key. Identifying information in the two-
touch protocols clearly reduces mFerio’s anonymity. However, no
other party (including banks, certificate authorities, and monitoring
agencies) will know anything about the transaction. Thus, mFerio
satisfies the Anonymous success criteria; but not as much as cash
does. Apart from enhanced security, a secondary benefit of com-
promising anonymity through the use of a two-touch protocol is
that it allows us to create automatic signed receipts of each transac-
tion. Availability of signed receipts make accountability and con-
flict resolution much easier. For true anonymity, mFerio can be
easily modified to use pseudonyms instead of actual names – how-
ever, that is not in the current implementation. These mechanisms
allows mFerio to satisfy the Auditing Criteria listed in Section 2.
3.3 Satisfying the Usability Criteria
We implemented several features in mFerio to make it as us-
able as cash payments while preserving strong security. Firstly,
mFerio tells users exactly where they are in the transaction stage
(two-touch protocol) and how much more needs to be done – sim-
ilar to web-based shopping cart checkouts. We display the user’s
current monetary balance on almost every protocol screen. In addi-
tion, mFerio requires users to explicitly confirm the full details of
the payment (receiver and amount) involved in a transaction. Once
the user has confirmed an action, a transaction summary screen is
displayed, where we show both the current, and the expected post-
transaction cash balances. This design allows users to a) know ex-
actly how much money they have, and b) completely understand
the financial implications of any transaction.
Furthermore, mFerio makes it easy to recover from errors. At
any time, the user can click the cancel button and stop the whole
process. Before secure keys are exchanged with the other party
(first touch in two-touch protocol), the user can also use the back
button to go back and change anything they desire. After the first
touch in the two-touch protocol, any changes will require cancelling
the payment and starting a new one because letting the user go back
after exchanging keys would compromise security.
Using User Feedback to Design mFerio. One of our main user
study goals was to evaluate the usability of our design decisions.
Along with that, we also gathered user feedback to choose among
some competing design choices of various mFerio application fea-
tures. The key design choices we verified in our user studies were
• One-touch or Two-touch Protocol?: mFerio uses a two-
touch protocol, as described in Section 3.1.2), to ensure that
users are confident of who exactly they are paying. How-
ever, a two-touch protocol does require a few more steps
(and a corresponding increased amount of time) than a one-
touch protocol. We verify whether users actually prefer the
increased security of a two-touch protocol over the speed of
a one-touch protocol in Section 5.5.5.
• Authentication Mechanism: mFerio requires users to au-
thenticate themselves before they can perform payment trans-
actions. However, how should this authentication be done?
Should the user re-authenticate themselves at every key trans-
action point? Is a single authentication when starting the
mFerio application sufficient? Should there be a timer that
triggers re-authentication? If so, what kind of timer (fixed or
inactivity-based?) should it be? To gain clarity, we presented
users with different possible authentication mechanisms and
the results are described in Section 5.5.5.
• Method for Receiving Transaction Requests: As stated at
the start of Section 3, mFerio can be used in four modes. In
all those modes, one party has to receive a request (either for
payment or to make payment) from the other party. One key
usability decision was deciding how to accept those requests
in mFerio. One possibility was for mFerio to always accept
requests as long as the user was not performing a transaction
at the moment. Another alternative was to require the user to
actively state (by entering a special mFerio mode) that they
were willing to receive requests. This explicit step increases
the burden on the user, but decreases the possibility of the
user accidently responding to transient transaction requests.
We presented our users with various options for receiving
payment requests and present the results in Section 5.5.5.
• Specifying Reason for Payment: mFerio automatically cre-
ates receipts for each transaction. However, a receipt, by it-
self, may not be that useful months, weeks, or even days later
as many transactions may look similar. Hence, mFerio pro-
vides a way for users to annotate their receipts with a reason
for the transaction (buying food for example). Section 5.5.5
describes the various options tried and the user response.
Overall, the various mechanisms implemented into mFerio, cou-
pled with the user-driven selection of various targeted features, al-
low mFerio to satisfy all but the availability criteria specified in
Section 2. This claim is well backed-up by the results of our us-
ability tests (shown in Sections 5 and 6). The availability criteria,
unfortunately, depends on more than a good implementation and
requires market support. We discuss some factors affecting mFe-
rio’s availability in Section 7.1.
3.4 The mFerio p2p Mobile Payment System
In this section, we put everything together and show the end-to-
end mFerio application. We developed mFerio as a J2ME applica-
tion on Nokia 6131 phones with built-in NFC capability. Figure 1
shows the sequence of steps needed to perform a p2p transaction
with mFerio. The user clicks on the mFerio application and then
performs the following steps:
1. The user first authenticates herself, using, for instance, a fin-
gerprint reader on the mobile phone.
2. The user then selects a task from the main menu. She can
either initiate a transaction to pay someone or initiate a trans-
action to request payment. She can also receive payment re-
quests on this screen. Finally, she can do basic management
(a feature not tested in this study) of her transaction prefer-
ences. For the rest of the description, we assume that the user
has decided to pay someone.
3. The user performs the first transaction step. She enters the
payment reason from a pre-defined pull down list, types in
the amount to be paid, and clicks okay to proceed. Note that
the current step is shown on the top left of the screen.
4. In the transaction’s second step, the user confirms the rea-
son for payment and the payment amount. She has to re-
authenticate at this screen to confirm the payment.
a) b) c) d)
e) f) g) h)
In this example, the user is initiating a payment. The sequence of steps for other three payment modes of mFerio (ask for payment,
receive payment, and receive request for payment) are similar. The user (a) first authenticates herself using a biometric fingerprint
reader, (b) chooses to pay someone, then (c) selects a reason from a predefined list, and enters an amount to pay. The user (d)
sees how much will be paid, (e) touches her phone with the recipient’s phone, and then (f) confirms the payment. Once confirmed,
the user (g) finalises the payment, and then (h) gets a receipt.
Figure 1: Screenshots of the mFerio Application
5. The user then brings her phone next to the recipient’s phone.
The recipient must be running mFerio and be in receive mode.
During this first connection, a private session key is created
for use by both the initiator and the recipient using the Diffie-
Hellman protocol. Each party’s mFerio application then en-
crypts basic information such as name and exchanges it with
its peer using the adapted Even-Goldreich-Yacobi protocol.
6. Basic information about each party is next displayed along
with the transaction details. For example, as shown in Fig-
ure 1f), the initiator will see the recipient’s name, the pay-
ment amount and reason for payment, and the values of her
stored cash before and after the transaction. The recipient
will see something similar. Both parties must re-authenticate
themselves to proceed to the final step.
7. The phones touch again to finalise the payment transaction
(using the Even-Goldreich-Yacobi protocol).
8. A “transaction complete” summary page is shown. This page
is then stored as an automatically signed receipt.
4. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
In this section, we explain how we evaluated the performance of
mFerio. Our goal was to determine if it satisfied the success criteria
described in Section 2 and summarised in Table 1.
We evaluated mFerio in two phases. The goal of the first phase
(Phase 1) was to test the effectiveness of the mFerio user inter-
face, and to fix any deficiencies found before investing the effort to
build a full system. Thus, we built a complete user interface that
followed the exact sequence of steps detailed above, including ex-
changing information using NFC. However, we did not implement
any of the security mechanisms needed for cash exchange as they
were unnecessary for validating the user interface – allowing us to
focus on key usability criteria without interference from other com-
ponents. A secondary goal of the phase 1 study was to identify key
design decisions that required user input (Section 3.3).
In the second phase (Phase 2), we implemented the complete
secure mFerio application, including the key exchange and encryp-
tion schemes necessary to guarantee the transaction security.
In both phases, we tested the speed, accuracy, and ease of use
of mFerio relative to cash transactions. In phase 1, we also asked
users to test specific components of mFerio such as the receipt fea-
ture and various authentication methods. In phase 2, we conducted
a full cognitive load test, using the NASA TLX method [14], of
mFerio and cash transactions to measure exactly what the differ-
ences between mFerio and cash are.
In addition, in phase 2, we conducted system performance tests
to measure exactly how long the security protocols took to com-
plete a transaction – the performance figures for the rest of mFerio
are omitted as it simply involves moving from one screen to an-
other which takes negligible time. The phase 1 study is detailed in
Section 5 while the phase 2 study is detailed in Section 6.
5. PHASE 1 STUDY: BASE PROPERTIES
We next describe our phase 1 user study. The primary goal of this
first study was to assess how well mFerio met the base criteria laid
Expt Amount in Wallet ($) Payment Change Objective
Code Amount ($) Received ($)
CB 1 10 (1 five, 2 twos, 1 one) 2 None 1 bill exchanged with no change.
CB 2 80 (1 fifty, 2 tens, 2 fives) 75.16 4.84 Few bills with change involved
CB 3 85.16 (1 fifty, 2 tens, 3 fives, 1 ten
cent, 1 five cent, 1 one cent)
75.16 N/A Few bills where participant needed to dig for ex-
act change
The participant was the one paying with the experimenter receiving the payment.
Table 2: Core Task Set 1 – Cash
Expt mFerio Starting Payment Change Objective
Code Value ($) Amount ($) Received ($)
mFB 1 80 −75.16 N/A Using mFerio to pay experimenter
mFB 2 80 +75.16 N/A Using mFerio to receive payment from experimenter
The participant had to initiate all payments. In one experiment, the participant had to pay the experimenter. In the other, the
participant received payment.
Table 3: Core Task Set 2 – mFerio
out earlier. A secondary goal was to gather detailed process data
to help identify areas for future improvements and research, and to
allow us to refine the design for the subsequent phase 2 user study.
We simulated the use of a fingerprint reader for fast authentication
by asking the users to press a button on the phone to simulate the
fingerprint reader (we added a little delay after the button press).
5.1 Method
We divided the experiments into three sets: tasks involving cash,
tasks involving mFerio, and a set of tasks to capture any learning
effects. The evaluation was within-subjects, but the task sets were
not randomly ordered (cash experiments came first and then the
mFerio experiments). Participants performed the cash experiments
first and then used mFerio. We chose this approach as we do not
believe there are any learning effects going from cash to mFerio
since people are already highly familiar with cash payments. Tasks
within each core task set were counterbalanced, however.
Each individual task took about 1 minute to complete, and had
the same basic structure: participants were asked to either receive
payment or pay the experimenter (the amounts involved was pro-
vided to them). A task was considered finished when the trans-
action was completed. To minimise bias, the choice of whether a
participant received or sent payment was randomly determined.
After each individual task, participants were provided a simple
questionnaire that asked them to rate, on a 5-point Likert scale, a)
whether they thought the task was quick to perform, b) how easy
they found the task, and c) how confident they were that they com-
pleted the task correctly. At the end of each set of tasks, participants
were given a longer questionnaire.
Task set 1 – Cash. In these baseline experiments, we measured
the time taken by participants to complete three typical cash trans-
actions – using those times to establish a baseline target for mFerio.
The cash tasks are described in Table 2. Each individual task started
with all money inside the wallets of both the participant and the ex-
perimenter, and the wallets kept in their usual place (inside a purse,
pocket, etc.). The task was considered finished when the final bills
were received, counted, and returned into the appropriate wallet.
Task set 2 – mFerio. In this set of experiments, participants were
asked to use mFerio to both pay someone and to send payment
to someone. In both cases, the participant was the initiator of the
transaction. At the end of the user study, the participant was asked
to redo one of the two tasks in this set (chosen randomly) to ob-
serve any learning effects. The tasks for this set are described in
more detail in Table 3. For each of these tasks, the participant had
to click an icon to start the mFerio application. A task was consid-
ered complete when the user reached the final confirmation screen
and clicked done on that screen (see Fig. 1h).
Task set 3 – mFerio Learning. After completing all the mFerio
tasks in Set 2, the participants were asked to repeat the first task
they did in Set 2. This was to detect any mFerio learning effects.
5.2 Participants and Setup
We recruited a total of 75 undergraduate students for our phase
1 study. Participation was open to all students at our university,
and we solicited participation through flyers, student association
emails, and also through specific emails sent to students who had
previously registered with the university-wide subject pool list. All
75 students did the same set of cash and mFerio tasks. Each user
study took about 30 minutes to complete.
Our participants were a mix of students from technical and non-
technical majors. We asked each participant to complete a short
(2–3 minutes) demographics survey to determine their familiarity
with cell phone technology. The possible answers were, 1) Have
you used MMS on your phone? 2) Have you browsed the Internet
from your phone? 3) Have you synchronised your phone with any
other device or software? 4) Have you installed applications on
your phone? Based on the (yes/no) answers given, we categorised
users into three buckets – “novice”, “intermediate”, and “expert”.
In addition, we asked each participant to state how important
their cell phone was to them by answering the following question:
How important is your phone to you? The possible answers were,
1) Not very important. I can go for a day or more without it; 2)
Somewhat important. A few hours without it probably will not do
any harm; and 3) Very Important, I have to have it with me all the
time. Table 4 shows the phase 1 participant demographics.
Participants were compensated at a flat rate of $10 SGD on com-
pletion of all tasks. We stressed that they were not under time pres-
sure, and could take as long as they needed to complete the task –
a deliberate bias against our goal of fast transaction times.
5.3 Experimental Procedure
The participants worked alone in a lab for the duration of the
study. For all experiments, a tester played the role of the other
person involved in the p2p transaction. Participants were provided
phones, basic training in how to use the phone and the NFC capabil-
ity, and instructions for each task in the study. The training period
Total number 75
Gender Male (35), Female (40)
Proficiency level Novice (22), Intermed. (30), Expert (23)
Phone importance Low (8), Medium (36), High (31)









































The error bars indicate standard deviations. Pair-wise t-tests
of the results show significance at 5%.
Figure 2: Measured Speed of mFerio and Cash
lasted less than five minutes, and involved the participant entering
alphanumeric input into a text box and then transferring that input
to another phone using NFC. This training helped teach the partic-
ipants how to use the phone’s NFC feature, and helped ensure that
participants were comfortable with the data entry features of the
Nokia 6131 NFC phone (e.g., backspace, decimal point, etc.). We
did not train our participants to use mFerio – the first time they saw
and used the application was during the real experiment.
5.4 Data Collected
We obtained completion times for each task and subtask (i.e.,
time to progress from one screen to another) by instrumenting the
phones. We also observed the participants during the study and
noted where they had trouble, were confused, or made mistakes.
Finally, we measured our participants perceptions, through an exit
survey, on quality of training, ease of use of mFerio, and user re-
ported performance for each subtask.
5.5 Results of Phase 1 User Study
5.5.1 mFerio is Fast
Figure 2 shows the time taken by the 75 participants to complete
the 3 cash experiments (Table 2) and the 2 mFerio base case ex-
periments (Table 3). In addition, participants were asked to repeat
the mFerio base case experiments at the end of the user study to
observe the effect of learning on speed of use. We also show the
results for these repeated experiments.
As expected, the simplest cash experiment (CB1) was the fastest
to complete. However, more complex tasks, where change was in-
volved, was slower to complete with cash than mFerio (comparing
CB2 and CB3 with mFB1 and mFB2). For task CB3, we did not
tell the participants a-priori that the cashier did not have change. If
the participants provided a larger amount, they were told to provide
exact change. As such, we expected task CB2 (paying and getting
change in return – a fairly straightforward task) to be the same or
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Cash with Change (CB3)
mFerio Send Money (mFB1)
mFerio Request Money (mFB2)
The x-axis is a 5-pt Likert scale. Scores to the left are better.
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Figure 4: Perceived Accuracy of mFerio
the opposite. We observed that our participants were more careful
about checking the amount of change they received, thus leading to
slower task completion in CB2.
In addition, mFerio showed a strong learning effect (comparing
mFB1 and mFB2 with the corresponding “With Learning” bars)
and after just 15 minutes of use, participants showed improvements
of up to 40% in performance. Hence, we conclude that the speed of
using mFerio is comparable to or even faster than a large number
of common cash use cases.
Participants also rated, on a 5-point Likert scale, how fast they
thought mFerio was to use. mFerio scored a 1.7 (1 is best, 5 is
worst) with a standard deviation of 0.75 – indicating that users were
happy with mFerio’s speed.
5.5.2 mFerio is Easy to Use with Minimal Training
Figure 3 shows how participants rated mFerio’s ease of use on a
5-point Likert scale (lower is better). Results are promising – 60 to
70% strongly agree that mFerio is easy to use while less than 5%
were either neutral or somewhat disagree. No participant strongly
disagreed that mFerio is easy to use.
5.5.3 mFerio Payments are Perceived as Accurate
Figure 4 shows the perceived accuracy of mFerio (same 5-point
Likert scale, lower scores better). Overall, participants were posi-

























































One Authentication with no timer
One Autentication with a preset timer
Authentication at key transaction points, no timer
Figure 6: User Perception of Authentication Modes
outliers, that strongly disagreed that mFerio is accurate. The outlier
observations were all for the “Request Money” task (the accuracy
question for this task was reverse coded); 66% of the outliers were
female students; and 33% of them were expert users. We did not
find any other abnormal behaviour, with respect to these outlier par-
ticipants, across the other tasks that would suggest a design flaw in
mFerio. Hence we do not see this as a cause for concern.
Even with these outliers, a large majority of the participants still
perceived mFerio as being very accurate. Given that the partici-
pants had never used mFerio previously, these results are very en-
couraging. Our future work involves developing techniques to fur-
ther improve mFerio’s perceived accuracy.
We assessed the actual task accuracy only at the end of each task;
by checking if the correct sum of money had been transferred (ei-
ther physically or digitally). We did not capture any errors that took
place during the task and were subsequently corrected. We found
that in all cases, the amount of money transferred was correct.
5.5.4 mFerio has Predictable Performance
We estimated task performance differences for the cash experi-
ments by calculating the difference in time and perceived ease-of-
use between the cash experiments. The difference in times between
CB1 and CB2 (Fig. 2) is significant at 1% (CB2 is on average 53
seconds or more than 6x slower to complete than CB1), while the
difference in perceived ease-of-use between CB1 and CB2 is also
significant at 1% (1.35 points, or 27%, on the 5 point scale).
However, we found no significant difference in time, perceived
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Figure 8: User Preference for Receipt Modes
periments. This suggests that mFerio does not suffer from un-
predictable performance problems even when the payment amount
changes. This was not unexpected, as paying someone $75.16 with
cash requires more operations and counting than $2, whereas with
mFerio, the difference is primarily a few extra text entry steps.
5.5.5 mFerio User Design Choices
In this section, we present the results of the user-verified usabil-
ity choices described in Section 3.3
One-touch or Two-touch Protocol? : After completing all ex-
periments, users were both interviewed and presented with an end
of experiment survey to obtain feedback on their preferred design
choices. A significant majority (90%) indicated that they preferred
a two-touch protocol even though it enforces several additional
steps (an extra touch, two additional confirmations) in a transac-
tion. Users felt that the additional steps in the two-touch protocol
gave them more control and better overall security.
Method for Receiving Transaction Requests : After demonstrat-
ing the automatic (mFerio automatically accepts requests when not
performing transactions), and manual (an explicit receive request
mode must be selected) transaction receiving modes, we asked each
user which method they preferred. Our results from this survey
indicate no significant difference in user preferences. 52% of the
users preferred the automatic mode of receiving transaction requests,
and 48% preferred having manual control over the ability to receive
requests. We thus retained the automatic mode as the default mFe-
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Figure 9: Task Speed in Different Receipt Modes
Authentication Mechanism : During our experiments, we asked
users to execute payments using five different authentication mech-
anisms: One authentication step only (when starting mFerio), multi-
point authentication (where authentication is needed at key points
during the two-touch protocol), one authentication step at the start
of the mFerio application combined with a fixed timer shown to the
user, one authentication step at the start of the mFerio application
combined with a fixed timer hidden to the user, and one authen-
tication step at the start of the mFerio application combined with
an inactivity timer (timer decreases only when the user stops using
the cellphone) shown to the user. In the authentication modes with
timers, the application would close automatically, cancelling any
pending transactions, once the timers reached zero.
We decided to use, guided by our base-case time results (Sec-
tion 5.5.1), a forty-five second limit for all the timers in our authen-
tication experiments. The time taken to complete transaction when
using different authentication mechanisms is shown in Figure 5,
while the user preference for various authentication mechanisms is
shown in Figure 6. From these results, we can conclude that the
timers (both shown and hidden) enhance task speeds. Also, users
perceive the multi-point authentication mechanisms as being more
secure than the one-step authentication (with or without timers).
We asked users to state their preferred authentication mechanism
without explaining to them the security differences between the dif-
ferent mechanisms. At the end of the user study, we explained
these differences to the users and asked them to re-state their pre-
ferred authentication mechanism (at this point, most users had for-
gotten their previous answers). The “Informed Decision” bars in
Figure 6 show the answers given by users after they were given
an explanation of each mechanism. It is interesting to note that,
while more users initially prefer to choose one-step authentication
with a preset-time, several of them convert to choose the multi-step
authentication mechanism after the debrief session.
We also captured user perceptions of payment security when they
experimented with the various authentication mechanisms. These
results are show in Figure 7. We see somewhat polarised results
here. Among users who agreed that the mFerio payment was se-
cure, there were more who perceived multi-step authentications as
more secure than the one-step authentication with preset timers.
On the other hand, among users who remained neutral or disagreed
that mFerio payment was secure, there were more users who per-
ceived one-step authentication with preset timers are more secure
than a multi-step authentication mechanism. Overall, both one-step
authentication with a preset timer shown to the user, and a multi-
step authentication choice seem to be viable for mFerio – the one-
step authentication with preset timer enhances task speed, while
the multi-step authentication gives users a better sense of control
in their payments. For the next phase of mFerio testing (testing a
complete system), we used one-step authentication as we did not
have any reasonably quick method to perform multi-step authenti-
cation. Again, we plan to revisit this design decision, as users seem
to prefer multi-step authentication, if fast, reliable authentication
mechanisms become commonly deployed.
Specifying Reason for Payment : mFerio provides various ways
for users to annotate their receipts with a reason for the transaction
(buying food for example). We compared user preference and per-
formance when they used a simple textbox, a drop-down list, and
a combobox (editable drop-down list) for annotating their receipts
during a mFerio payment transaction. These results are presented
in Figures 8 and 9 respectively. Although, the combobox method
of receipt annotation increases time taken to complete a transaction
(15 seconds more than the base case), there is an overwhelming
preference for that. Hence we chose to adopt a combobox style of
receipt annotation for the final mFerio prototype build.
6. PHASE 2 USER STUDY: FULL SYSTEM
In phase 2, we tested a complete mFerio implementation, with all
security protocols fully implemented. This complements the phase
1 study, by 1) assessing the exact cognitive load of mFerio relative
to cash, 2) testing mFerio with a more diverse population, and 3)
comparing cash and mFerio in more diverse treatments. The overall
experimental setup, procedure, and data collected was similar to
that used in phase 1, but the experimental treatments were different.
6.1 Method
This study used three scenarios: base, time pressure, and low
light. In the base scenario, participants performed eight tasks – four
cash and four mFerio tasks. We used the same four tasks, as stated
in Figure 5, for both the cash and mFerio experiments. We only
used tasks 1B and 2B (for both cash and mFerio) for the time pres-
sure and low light scenarios as we were primarily interested in user
performance with more difficult tasks under adverse conditions.
The evaluation was within-subjects, but the task sets were not
randomly ordered. In each scenario, all the cash tasks were per-
formed in sequence first followed by the mFerio tasks (also in se-
quence). Each task took a minute or less to complete.
After each individual task, participants were provided a simple
questionnaire that asked them to rate, on a 5-point Likert scale, a)
whether they thought the task was quick to perform, b) how easy
they found the task, and c) how confident they were that they com-
pleted the task correctly. They were also asked to complete the
NASA-TLX survey [14] after each experiment. At the end of all
the experiments, the participants received a longer questionnaire.
Scenario 1 – Baseline. The base scenario was used to obtain base-
line cognitive load values for cash and mFerio.
Scenario 2 – Time Pressure. In this scenario, we told each partic-
ipant that they only had 30 seconds to finish each task – simulating
real-world situations where payments have to be made quickly.
Scenario 3 – Low Light. In this scenario, we lowered the lighting
in the experiment room to simulate low light conditions – such as
street light conditions. This simulates common situations where
cash payments are made in locations without perfect lighting.
6.2 Participants and Setup
We recruited a total of 29 participants for our phase 2 study. All
29 users did the same set of cash and mFerio tasks. Each phase 2
user study took about 30 minutes to complete.
Expt Code Payment Amount ($) Cash Received ($) Objective
1A Pay $5 N/A Simple Cash Exchange
1B Pay $8.65 N/A Pay non-trivial Amount
2A Ask for $1.30 Receive $2 and return $0.70 Collect small payment
2B Ask for $36.40 Receive $50 and return $13.60 Collect large payment
These four experiments are used for both the cash and mFerio experiments in phase 2 (for all three scenarios). For cash
experiments 2A and 2B, the participant received more than the requested amount and had to provide change (amount stated in
the “Cash Received” column).
Table 5: Core Task Set – Phase 2
Total Number 29
Gender Male (19), Female (10)
Age 20 and below (12), 20 to 30 (13)
Above 30 (4)
Proficiency Level Novice (10), Intermediate (7),
Expert (12)
Importance of Phone Low (12), Medium (14), High (3)
Table 6: Demographic Statistics for Phase 2 Study.
Our participants were a mix of undergraduate students (12), grad-
uate students (2), and teaching and support staff (15). The partic-
ipants had a mix of technical and non-technical backgrounds. We
used the same demographics survey as in phase 1 to identify their
cell phone proficiency levels and their perceived importance of their
cell phone. Table 6 details the phase 2 participant demographics.
6.3 Results of Phase 2 User Study
We observed that the speed, ease-of-use, and accuracy results
from phase 2 were similar to those obtained in phase 1 – validating
our phase 1 results. Due to space constraints, we only present the
new security protocol performance, and cognitive score results.
6.3.1 Measured mFerio Runtime Performance
During these experiments we logged the time taken by the mFe-
rio application to execute the two-touch protocol, using the adapted
Even-Goldreich-Yacobi security protocols, described in Section 3.1.2
separately from the user transaction time. As expected, the first
touch (exchanging credentials) protocol times (average: 1.069 sec-
onds, minimum: 0.995 seconds, maximum: 1.295 seconds, stan-
dard deviation: 0.0732), were significantly lower than the second
touch (making payment and signed receipt transfer) protocol times
(average: 4.850 seconds, minimum: 4.697 seconds, maximum:
5.242 seconds, standard deviation: 0.150).
Overall, the results are on the high side and indicate that public-
key cryptography may not be the most suitable security primitives
to use on some cellphones – an area for future mFerio research and
implementation. Nonetheless, even with these high protocol times,
users still found mFerio faster, with significantly less cognitive load
(as shown in the next section), than cash in some scenarios.
6.3.2 mFerio has low cognitive load
Table 7 shows the cognitive load scores for the three scenarios
in the phase 2 user study. We computed the cognitive load scores
using the method proposed by Hart [14] (ask the user to provide
ratings for six dimensions of load and combine those ratings using
the user-provided importance rankings). The values in the table are
average scores with the standard deviation provided in brackets.
The “% Diff.” column is the percentage difference between Cash
and mFerio for that scenario (i.e. Cash−mFerio
Cash
∗ 100)). Positive
values indicates that mFerio has lower cognitive scores than cash.
There are no scores for experiments 1A and 2A for the Time
Pressure and Low Light scenarios as we did not run these experi-
ments in those scenarios. The “% Change” columns indicate how
much the value has changed from the corresponding base scenario
value – a positive number indicates that the cognitive load has in-
creased by that percentage compared to the base scenario value.
From the table, we observe that cash has lower cognitive load
than mFerio only for experiment 1A in the base scenario (cash
has 48.2% less cognitive load). In every other case, mFerio has
lower cognitive loads – reaching a high of 68.1% lower load for
experiment 2B in the time pressure scenario. Figure 10 shows the
breakdown of the cognitive load components for all the base exper-
iments – for both cash and mFerio. The figure clearly shows that,
except for experiment 1A, cash has a much higher cognitive load
than mFerio – for almost every load component.
We also observe, from the table, that the cognitive load for cash
significantly increased in the time pressure and low light scenarios.
For example, participants performing experiment 1B reported, on
average, 60.8% higher cognitive load values when doing the exper-
iment under time pressure compared to the base scenario.
The cognitive load scores for mFerio also increased in three of
the four non-base scenarios (time pressure and low light). However,
these increases were not significant. In the last experiment (Low
Light scenario, experiment 1B), mFerio’s cognitive load actually
significantly decreased relative to the base load (by 22.1%). We are
investigating the cause of this decrease – we suspect that it might
be due to various learning effects (mFerio is not really affected by
low light conditions as the phone has a built-in light source).
Overall, mFerio significantly outperformed cash, in terms of cog-
nitive load, in a number of common scenarios. This validates our
goal of building an easy intuitive system for mobile p2p payments.
7. DISCUSSION
7.1 Additional Requirements for Deployment
In this paper, we presented part of the overall solution needed
for a practical p2p payment system – we focused on the design and
evaluation of the user interface. Before such a system can be de-
ployed, several additional challenges need to be addressed:
Stake Holder Dynamics: A successful mFerio deployment will
require cooperation from multiple stake holders, such as banks (to
support the digital cash used), cellphone manufacturers and tele-
com service providers (to promote mFerio to their customers), re-
tailers, regulatory bodies (to legalise p2p payments), and consumers.
Unfortunately, satisfying the business and strategic goals of multi-
ple stake holders is very difficult and achieving sufficient buy-in
may require governmental and regulatory body support. A more
detailed discussion of the policy changes and strategies necessary
for industry adoption of mFerio is beyond the scope of this paper.
MassMarket Appeal: Ensuring mass market appeal for mFerio is
important to leverage scale economies and the network externality
effect where mFerio’s utility is influenced by one’s social network.
Expt Base Time Pressure Low Light
Code Cash mFerio % Diff. Cash mFerio % Diff. Cash mFerio % Diff.
Actual % Actual % Actual % Actual %
Change Change Change Change
1A 8.2 (2.4) 12.1 (3.2) -48.2 * N/A
1B 15.3 (3.3) 10.6 (3.2) 30.9 * 24.7 (9.2) 60.8 * 11.5 (4.1) 8.4 53.4 * 20.1 (6.2) 31.4 * 8.3 (1.2) -22.1 * 59.0 *
2A 11.6 (3.5) 6.6 (2.2) 43.1 * N/A
2B 18.8 (4.3) 6.5 (1.8) 65.4 * 23.7 (9.0) 25.6 * 7.5 (2.4) 15.6 68.1 * 21.5 (5.5) 13.9 * 7.7 (2.2) 17.6 64.3 *
results significant at 5% (using two-tailed tests) are indicated by *; lightly shaded results are not significant.
Table 7: Cognitive Load Scores
If the entities in a person’s network are not mFerio ready, then one
has to still use cash for payments. One way to increase mFerio’s
mass market appeal is to make it highly usable and an easy replace-
ment for all cash transactions. This, unlike the various other chal-
lenges, is something that we can impact. Hence, we concentrated
on making mFerio as usable as possible.
Phased Deployment: mFerio is more likely to succeed if it can
be introduced gradually. In Singapore, one possible path is to ini-
tially introduce mFerio as a replacement for existing mobile pay-
ment systems, such as CashCard [27] or EZ-Link [12], that use
NFC-enabled cards to make payments; users top up their cards, via
NFC, at special machines. mFerio can easily be modified to sup-
port these systems initially. As the mFerio user base grows (people
might prefer paying with their phones instead of carrying a separate
card), the p2p aspects of mFerio can be enabled. We are currently
investigating this phased deployment strategy in more detail.
7.2 Comparing mFerio With Other Systems
In this paper, we chose to compare mFerio solely with traditional
cash payments. However, there are other mobile payment systems;
for example, token-based NFC-enabled payment systems (Cash-
Card, EZ-Link, etc.), SMS-based payment systems (Gpay [33],
Obopay [28] etc.), and custom-application or browser-based online
payment systems (Paypal Mobile [29] etc.).
These systems are fundamentally different from mFerio as they
either use physical secure tokens (Cashcard etc.), or infrastructure
support (SMS and online methods). Their protocols can thus be
greatly simplified (to one-touch/one-step systems even) as a) the
burden of authentication is moved to the infrastructure and/or to-
kens, and b) the usage scenarios limit the amount of user interaction
needed. For example, the amount to pay is automatically computed
by the token-based systems (based on length of travel etc.), the cell
phone provider has verified details for all participants in an SMS-
based payment systems, and Paypal authenticates all participants
a-priori. In a true p2p payment system, the onus of authentication
mostly falls on the participants of the system. The mFerio proto-
col is thus quite different and, generally, longer (to provide user
input and user-visible authentication) compared to other payment
systems; making direct comparisons misleading in our opinion.
7.3 User Study Limitations
Our two user studies are an important first step in identifying
the usability of mFerio. However, they do have limitations. First,
our participants were mostly 18 – 25 year old undergraduate stu-
dents – a general population might show different results. Second,
both studies were conducted in a controlled test environment – real
world situations could affect mFerio’s usability differently.
7.4 Effect of Demographics on Usability
We also noticed that the mFerio task completion times did not
significantly vary across the experts and novices. Further, we no-
ticed that there was no significant learning differences between the
expert and novice population as well. Also, the only significant
difference in the mFerio task completion time across the male and
female participants was in the mFerio sending money task in phase
1(mFB1). The male participants were faster than the female par-
ticipants by about 3 seconds on the average in this case. However
this difference in performance across the genders disappears when
learning effects are accounted for. Hence we infer that there is no
significant difference in the necessary design requirements of mFe-
rio across the expertise or gender spread.
8. RELATEDWORK
Davies [9] summarises various technological innovations with
monetary payment systems including traditional cash and digital
cash. There has also been a fair amount of past work looking at mo-
bile payment in general. Kreyer et. al offer a typology of different
mobile payment systems [19] – mFerio falls under the macropay-
ments to stationary merchants and customer-to-customer transac-
tion categories. They also spell out three criteria for general accep-
tance of mobile payment systems: cost, security, and convenience.
In this paper, we focused primarily on convenience though mFerio
was also designed with the first two criteria in mind.
Zmijewska [41] provides a summary of various wireless tech-
nologies for mobile payment, describing the pros and cons of 2G,
2.5G, 3G, infrared, NFC, and Bluetooth. Zmijewska also describes
results from field trials showing that NFC is perceived to be more
trusted due to required proximity. Near-field communication is al-
ready in wide use for contactless payments, for example, with smart
cards and fixed readers. Our work here leverages the growing trend
of NFC being installed on mobile phones, and focuses on making
payments using phones rather than fixed readers.
Past UI research has looked at using NFC for novel interaction
techniques. For example, Pering et. al [30] look at how a gesture to
connect two devices together can be implemented using NFC and
accelerometers and Want et. al [38] looked at how RFIDs could
be used to bridge the gap between the physical and virtual worlds.
Chen and Adams [8] provide a survey of different kinds of NFC
technologies that could be used for mobile payments. Our work
focuses less on developing novel interaction techniques, and more
on using NFC to facilitate the sending or receiving of payments.
In addition to commercial smartcard payment systems [12, 25,
27, 37], many other types of mobile payment systems have been
developed. For example, SmartRestaurant [24] allows customers
to order and pay for meals at university campus restaurants. U-
Payment [23] describes techniques for secure and private financial
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Each kiviat graph represents a different experiment. Each of the six axis ranges from 0 to 40 – smaller values are better.
Figure 10: Base Scenario: Cognitive Load Breakdown
transactions using mobile devices. Herzberg [16] describes many
of the security issues involved in mobile payment systems. Our
work differs as we are investigating the design and usability evalu-
ation of a distributed peer-to-peer payment system, that uses mobile
phones and NFC, rather than a centralised one.
Finally, there are a number of commercial companies that either
have or are planning to release mobile payment solutions. For ex-
ample, in addition to offerings in Japan and South Korea [32] (by
service providers), Obopay Inc. [28] and Paypal [29] have already
deployed mobile payment solutions with Google about to offer an
additional solution (Gpay [33]). Kreyer et al [19] list several other
commercial ventures. However, all these competing solutions use
SMS or GPRS (requiring infrastructure) as their message protocol
and do not support p2p communications. The work closest to mFe-
rio is the mNETS [4] mobile payment system. However, even this
NFC-based system does not support p2p transfers.
9. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we presented the design and evaluation of mFerio,
a NFC-enabled mobile p2p payment system. mFerio’s design was
informed by analysing the key tradeoffs between usability, utility,
and security – fundamental to any mobile p2p payment system.
Our analysis led us to a set of requirements for usability, security,
and auditing. We then iterated our design several times to minimise
the number of steps involved, while providing a strong level of se-
curity from the end-user’s perspective. Finally, the results of a two-
phase user study conducted with a total of 104 participants showed
that mFerio is highly usable and is even faster than cash under var-
ious common scenarios. mFerio also showed lower cognitive loads
than cash in a majority of cases.
The current mFerio prototype is part of a longer term project that
aims to create a digital wallet-type architecture for cellphones. This
digital wallet will allow users to store everything currently in their
physical wallets (cash, identification, credit cards, receipts, etc.) in-
side their cellphones. We are already developing different aspects
of a digital wallet, in parallel, and plan to work with various ven-
dors to overcome some of the real-world challenges of deploying a
digital wallet solution, such as getting mass market appeal.
In the near future, we plan to deploy a full version of mFerio in
a real environment using a larger and more varied population pool.
We also plan to test a variety of usable authentication schemes that
can be employed on mFerio.
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